

IMMEDIATE

3 March 1980


Note for NI0s

SUBJECT: DCI Worldwide Briefing

1. The DCI decided that, for his briefing of the SASC on 6 March, he would use the briefing format used last week with the SSCI and SBC (modified only by his notes, the addition of material on the Third World, and any revisions necessary to account for recent events).

2. A smooth draft of the DCI's talking points is attached (it has not yet been proof-read). Please review and note any changes you would suggest. Your comments should be received by 1200 today, Monday, 3 March, so that all changes can be made and the paper submitted to the DCI for his review/comment Monday evening.

3. The DCI has concurred in the new arrangement for NI0 backup as used at the SSCI/SBC hearings.



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PB/NSC Coordinator

Attachment

As stated

CONGRESSIONAL WORLDWIDE BRIEFING: OVERVIEW

I. Introduction

Very pleased to have this opportunity

1979 was dramatic year

- Began with fall of Shah
- Ended with invasion of Afghanistan
- In between: Sino-VN war, Somoza of Nicaragua, Soviet brigade in Cuba, El Salvador, hostages in Iran were all dramatic points

Today: Want to give overview

II. Soviet Union

(VG 1: Map-
USSR & WP)

- A. Dynamism in Sov. mil. growth, changes in self-image as global player/superpower, & opportunities (found or created) have contributed to Sov. ability & willingness to adopt more forward position & to project power abroad
 - 1. The blatant invasion of Afghan with large-scale use of Sov. forces = new high point in more assertive phase of Sov. foreign policy
 - Started in mid-1970s with Angola intervention
 - 2. What portend? Depends on why
 - a. In atmosphere deteriorating detente; & underestimation US/world reaction, believe immediate motive: prevent a loyal Marxist regime from falling
 - Timing related to Sov. assessment of internal Afghan situation
 - Assessment of strategic opportunity prevent loss/make gain for which willing to accept costs
 - b. Present goals: create secure satellite
 - But ran into trouble
 - Don't have pol. base
 - Mil. tactics & execution poor
 - Afghan resistance greater than expected
 - World, esp. Muslim, reaction greater than expected

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-Options:

(a) Unilateral withdrawal

-But pol. imposs. unless could leave reliable successor regime in place

(b) Hunker down & keep fighting

(1) Hold cities, LOCs with forces around current size
-Bound to be tempted into CI

(2) Large increase in force to prosecute widespread CI war

(c) Negotiate?

-But Sov. position now too weak to accept this option

-Who'll take over gov't & not be anti-Sov?

-But Sovs. must be doing well enough to be able to afford considering negot., withdrawal. Yet not so well that they feel a mil. solution is at hand.

3. In sum, we see continuing active Sov. role in Afghan & SW Asia in general

a. With respect Pak:

-Don't expect Sovs. to employ mil. force overtly against Pak (unless Pak gov't support to or use of Pak territory by Afghan insurgents really hurts)
-As noted on map, Soviets in position to encourage independent Pushtinistan, support anti-Pakistani Baluchi ambition, & anti-Iranian Baluchis.

-Sov. objectives: create disincentive for Paks to collaborate with US or PRC to oppose Sov. interests

b. With respect to Iran:

(VG 3: Map- Sov. Fcs. in Transcaucus)

-Transcaucus activity: know have contingency plan for invasion
-But do not expect one:

(1) Hands full in Afghan

(2) Opportunities for expanded role thru left
-Bani-Sadr's chances not good

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(3) Danger galvanizing US-West

-And/or US-PRC coop

(4) Muslim world

-At this point - not vital to prospects; can wait;
& measures of cost high

c. Elsewhere in Mid-East

-See Sov. aims as containing adverse reaction to
Afghan; & frustrating Camp David
-Moment: Syria
-Refocus attention on Palestinian issue - Recognize
as major divisive issue between US & Arabs
-Also will continue to support So. Yemen - hope
intimidating Saudis from strong anti-Sov stance

d. In Europe: impact of Afghan is to increase Sov. efforts
to drive wedges between US, Allies

-Appeal to Eur. desire for detente - arms control negot.
-Using "carrot & stick" approach, esp. w/Germany

e. Yugoslavia

-Yugoslav leadership cohesion increased by Sov.
invasion of Afghan

-Concerned same may happen to them
-This may serve as additional deterrent to USSR
initiating mil./pol. pressures

-Tito's January incapacitation suggests transition to
collective leadership will prob. be smooth

-But informal power structure began to emerge
which, over time, could lead to conflicts w/in
Regime

f. Sino-Soviet Relations

-Due invasion, prospects for ameliorating unsatisfactory
bilateral relations even dimmer (PRC recently cancelled
talks on all but low-level navigation matters)
-Likelihood for increased temperature in relations

4. Outcome of Afghan intervention could also strongly condition
foreign policy orientation of successors to Brezhnev

a. Success could set important precedent for successors,
some of which may in any case be dubious about benefits of
detente

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b. A hi-cost pyrrhic victory could provide opposite momentum strengthening position of those already concerned about disproportionate costs of 3rd World adventures

c. Leadership transition is on -

Brezhnev still in control, but maneuvering
No clear prediction

Expect transitional leadership

Kirilenko
Chernenko

Not as strong - but 73 & 68

3-4 years another baton passing-new generation

d. New leadership face difficult, fundamental decision

No? Sov. view mil. prowess as having provided great benefits

e. But new leadership will face choice on continuing this emphasis in face mounting econ. problems

5. All of the Bloc Economies - going downhill

a. USSR

(1) '79 grain crop worst since '75 (179 mt)

-Result of drought

(2) Industry faltering. This graphic is representative of what has been happening to the Sov. economy. You will note that, in the key industrial areas noted, 1979 saw a drop in the annual average growth, even a negative growth

-Transportation snarls, raw material shortfalls, few improvements in productivity--all had an effect

(3) Consumer losing ground, due

-Crop failures
-Less housing construction
-Consumer/household good production shortfalls

(4) Now, effect of current econ. sanctions--by US alone & in combination w/Allies--is noted on this chart

(VG 4: Chart-
Industry Faltering)

(VG 5: Chart-
Effects of Econ.
Actions)

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- 1 year embargo force meat consumption to level of early '70s
- Prolonged denial severely curtail livestock program to '85

b. Effect of other actions depends on duration & extent of cooperation of Allies

- Petroleum equipment & know how: long-term denial accelerate decline in oil production & reduce potential for stemming decline in late '80s
- Steel products & equipment: long-term embargo impede steel industry modernization & interfere w/pipeline construction

c. In other areas, too, current US actions can have some effect

- Credits: long-term denial limits purchases to current earnings, which fall with reduced oil output
- Olympic boycott: embarrass leadership; deprive of prestige, propaganda activities

d. It should be noted that while these actions are not likely to lead to the withdrawal of Sov. troops from Afghan, they do have the effect of imposing certain costs on the Soviets: political, image, economic...

6. With/without sanctions potential for econ. turnaround--bleak

(VG 6: Chart-
USSR Oil. Prod.)

a. Oil production to peak this year (11.8-11.9 mb/d)

- As noted in this chart sharp declines expected
- Alternative energy too slow to help before late '80s

(VG 7: Chart-
Mnpwr. Shtges.)

b. Decline in rate growth available labor & capital resources. This chart graphically notes the declining pool of labor

- Manpower shortage/maldistribution
- New Eur. workers barely replace retirees
- Only Central Asian Muslim provide increment to work force
- But unskilled, undereducated (poor Russian), unwilling to leave home to go where needed (Eur, Russia, Siberia)

c. No sign of willingness to slow down mil. spending

II. What trends in strategic, conventional arms spending?

-Sov. leaders continue to regard nuclear war a distinct possibility

1. Most likely to arise from NATO-Pact conflict when NATO used nuclear weapons to avoid defeat

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2. Limited use of nuc. weapons would quickly escalate to intercontinental war, but restricting nuc. weapons to theater level not ruled out

3. It would be a catastrophe to be avoided if at all possible

-Sovs. strategic doctrine:

-Place USSR in position to survive nuc. war in stronger position than adversaries, should deterrence fail-war fighting--i.e., deterrence derives from showing US we would be ultimate loser

-Soviet "bolt from the blue" attack highly unlikely

-Soviets capable of surprise, preemptive or retaliatory attacks & of launching ICBMs on tactical warning

(VG 8: Chart-Trends)

A. Trends in Strategic Offensive Forces--Continued, persistent programs to modernize Sov. forces during the past year

1. In delivery vehicles, weapons, ICBM accuracy

a. Delivery vehicles--# constant, complying with SALT I & anticipating SALT II reduction

b. Weapons--#

[REDACTED]

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c. Latest MIRVed versions of 2 largest Sov. ICBMs more accurate than earlier versions

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2. In research & development

[REDACTED]

B. Where this R&D + completion ongoing programs take Soviets? Depends in large part on SALT

1. Without SALT II Limits

a. Don't expect immediate, irreversible response to SALT deferral

b. If Sovs. choose to abandon SALT II limits we both are still observing

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(1) Could take any of the following actions soon--all of which would be in some sense reversible

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- Don't dispense with old subs to compensate for new Deltas, decision point this spring
- Build more MIRV silos to revert to pre-SALT negotiations plan of plus 100
- Increase Backfire production
- Test more than the allowed 1 new ICBM

(2) Could also take several actions more difficult to reverse

- Test more warheads on SS-18
- Resume testing SS-16 mobile IRBM

c. Over long run if Sovs. decide to build up forces in absence of SALT II, they could: deploy new systems & further fractionate ICBMs & SLBMs; increase survivability by deploying more mobile ICBMs & SLBMs

d. And comparing a US & Sov. buildup that both start in '80

Green line - Sov. in '80; blue line - US in '80

(VG 9: Chart-
Index No-SALT:
green line-'80,
blue line-'80)

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(VG 10: Chart-Index;
Second green line=
Sov. Breakout in '86)

(2) For purposes of comparison--next chart adds 2nd green line. Shows if the Sovs. want to break out of the SALT II limits only after the Treaty expires, Sov. forces by '89 could approach projected No-SALT forces. In a sense it is a measure of Sov. inducement to jettison SALT II--In comparison a moderate buildup starting in '80 would get them there earlier

(3) Soviets have some constraints on pace of buildup & qualitative improvements

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- Technological limits (e.g. in ASW & air & missile defense)
- R&D lead times
- Production bottlenecks
- Limitations on some materials (e.g. fissionable materials)
- Projected SALT II limited & No-SALT forces described are w/in Sov. tech. & econ. capacity

e. Higher Possibilities

- (1) Variety of possibilities for more threatening Sov. forces than shown
- (2) But could not achieve in all components simultaneously significantly better quality & higher levels of forces than projected

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C. Warsaw Pact headlines for '79

- In NATO, new concensus re LRTNF & modest progress toward modernization per LTDP
- In Pact, Brezhnev's unilateral disarmament gesture of Oct '79:

(VG 14: Chart-Tanks in Sov. Units)

- Up to 20,000 men, 1,000 tanks to be withdrawn w/in 1 year
- About 1,400 men & 100 tanks out in Dec '79
- Sov. start with 9,400 tanks in Central Europe: 1,000 is just over 10%
- N.B., aside from tanks in units, Sov. have an additional 1,400 older models in GDR, used for training or kept in storage
- First 100 tanks out were older T-62 models
- Sov. could decide to withdraw others from these 1,400

Comparisons - 7 Categories

1. Modernization of Pact forces continues at greater rate than NATO
- Sov. spending for mil. @ 11-12% GNP (rubles) throughout '70s

(VG 15: Chart-Tot. Def. Activities)

- Graphic compares CIA estimates of \$ cost of USSR defense activities, 1970-'79

- (-\$ cost estimate = cost to produce & man in US the size & type of force USSR has)
- From '72 onward, cost of Sov. defense activities has exceeded US by widening margin. Today: diff. about 50%
- (\$50 billion) measured in \$, 30% measured in rubles
- w/o manpower, Sov > 40% US in '79; w/o RDT&E (least certain part of our estimates) Sov. > 45% US in '79
- Biggest diff. are in intercontinental attack forces, land forces, RDT&E as next graphic shows
- Diff. less pronounced for gen. purpose nav. forces, tac. air

(VG 16: Chart-Attack Fcs., Land Fcs., RDT&E)

(-Re: NATO-WP comparison

- Comp. is diff. to estimate

- Don't have independent ests. of costs of NATO, non-Sov. WP defense activities
- Data available vary greatly & categories not consistently defined

- Can make inferences about gen. trends

- Most NATO countries in '70s allocated > 3% of national resources to defense

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-All except Portugal & US had real growth in defense spending, 1970-'79
-US: decreased avg. 2.5%/year, 1970-'77

-Pact

-USSR = 11-12% of GNP devoted to defense
-E. Ger., Czech: 3-4% GNP to defense, 1970-'78
-Other Pact countries: 2-3% range
-Growth rates (avg. annual):

-Czech, Hung, Romania, Poland: 3-4%
-E. Ger.: 5-6%
-By late '70s, real growth appeared to hold steady or decline)

(VG 17: Chart-
US/USSR \$ for
Defense)

-Likely Sov. response to 5% US increase: Little perceptible effect on Sov. defense expenditures over next 5 years

-Sov. spending has been unresponsive to shifts in US defense spending for past 15 years as graphic shows

-Other modernization highlights

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(VG 18: Chart-
Pact MBT Procurement)

(VG 19: Chart-
Tank Mob. M&M+15)

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3. Afghan operation showed Sov. airlift to best advantage on periphery USSR

-Inserted "diversionary" units (Ranger-like shock troops)
to secure airfields [redacted] 25X1
-Air-landed 2 Abn. Div. via shuttle airstream
-Secured defiles for 4 MR Divs.--all mobilized (3 Cat. III
& 1 Cat. II)--advancing overland
-Emplaced key C, CSS

C. Projection by sea

1. Amphibious

But, have only 1/3 amphibious lift of US, 1/5 amphibious assault troops & amphib. construction slowed to less than 10,000 tons/year: coastal threat to Baltic, Black Seas, Norwegian

(VG 24: Chart-
Out of Area
Ship Days)

2. Another form of naval projection is high peacetime visibility/presence. This grew rapidly in '60s, sustained through '70s at approx. 40K ship/days/year (combatants & aux.) - rapid response in crises

-Dispatched task group w/Kresta-II cruiser to Gulf of Tonkin during China-Vietnam crisis (Feb '79)
-Indian Ocean presence continues, now at higher level than norm.

D. Use of 3rd Country Surrogate Forces

1. During '79 surrogate forces (Cubans) remained in Angola, Ethiopia. Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea late '78

2. Both Cubans & Vietnamese have their own policy aims in these regions but generally coincide w/Sovs.

E. Arms Supplies

In Ethiopia '78 Sov. combined use of surrogate Cuban forces w/provision of mil. hardware to indigenous forces

[redacted] 25X1
Issue here is not arms sales - separate matter - but the rapid provision of arms to effect outcome of a conflict

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IV. By way of summary, want to address overall combat missions of Sov. forces

-Three overall combat missions:

- Conduct strategic strikes vs. US, NATO, PRC-strategic
- Destroy enemy's capability for counterstrike-strategic
- Defense via preemptive offensives-conventional?

-Ground, air, naval forces also designed to protect longest land border of any nation & to beat any possible combination of adversaries

-Ground forces:

- 55% opposite NATO; 25% opp. PRC
- Armor-heavy, w/massive firepower, designed for fast, deep offensives

-Air forces: org. for air defense + offensive strikes in conjunction w/advancing land forces

-Navy: centered around ballistic missile submarines; otherwise geared to fight mainly on periphery of land theaters

-NB:

- We doubt Sovs. intend to mount major ops. vs. SLOCs (at least initially)
- Naval ops. in Med. probably limited to eastern Med.
- In Pacific: SSBNs deployed for strat. strike. Conventional forces: limited to defending maritime approaches to USSR in NE Asia

-Ways Sov. currently perceive threats they face

(-Caveat: not predictions or ranking)

- Most immediate: expansion of Afghan crisis to other countries in SW Asia & Persian Gulf, raising spectre of confrontation w/US
- Eur., of course, is major concern

- Sphere of influence for both US, USSR
- Prospect of continued pol.-mil. competition
- Instability in E. Eur.

-Longer-term: growth in PRC mil. capabilities, esp. in climate of mutual hostility

-Strategic nuc. conflict w/US

-Know we posses powerful weapons, are capable of adding more (MX, Trident), & that we redefining role of GPF in ways that could be more threatening to adventurism in 3rd World, + perceive US to be "unpredictable"

-But don't think US "1st-strike" very likely

-Sovs. believe this because forces they have built, they argue, inhibits US

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V. Third World (suggested theme: important to look beyond "Iranistan")

A. Energy

1. '79 was year in which oil producers found new opportunity & willingness to take advantage of tight market in order to raise prices 25X1

a. Upward price pressure of hawks will prevail in '80 [redacted]

b. Conservatist attitudes also prevail

(VG 25: Chart-
OPEC Prod: Results
of Con.)

-Actual OPEC prod. likely drop to 29 mil. b/d in '80
as shown in graphic
(vs. 31 + mill. b/d in '79)

-Countries want to conserve & go slow on development
(to avoid upheaval)

c. Increases in non-OPEC capacity won't offset this decline

-'80 estimate No. Sea/Mex. est. increase, 1.2 mill. b/d,
but US, Can. decline by .4 m - w/OPEC drop 1.9 - net
1.1 shortfall
(Mexico's increases won't make much diff. in '80)

-'81 estimated shortfall: 0.4 mill. b/d
(OPEC est. decline, 2.2 mill. b/d; US/Can. est.
decline 0.6 mill. b/d; No. Sea/Mex. est. increase
2.4 mill. b/d)
(Mex. makes difference here-but could also
stimulate higher demand)

d. Outlook: Precarious balance

-Real question whether we can cut consumption enough
to offset cuts in prod.

-Supply avail. to indust. countries will decline thru
'85 - contrast to constantly increasing demand of
past decade

-+ we vulnerable to embargo, sabotage, internal
disorders

-Price pressures will continue & depress real
econ. growth

B. But we should be much more concerned w/the long-term indicators
throughout region than just w/today's price of oil

(VG 26: Map-
M. East, S. Asia)

1. Mid. East is still in great turmoil despite major step toward
peace in the form of the Camp David Accords

a. The clash of traditional religious values w/the pressures
of modernization manifest [redacted]

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b. Overarching issue: Obtaining a comprehensive & viable peace between the Arabs & Israelis, & radicalization

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2. Issue of superpower involvement in a region that stretches from Morocco to the Indian subcontinent remains the vital question in forming the posture of these nations

(VG 27: Map-Yemens)

a. The Yemens: The most immediate threat to Saudi Arabia, the region & by extension to the west fact that North Yemen (YAR) & its President Salih have moved substantially to left since last spring

-Sov. presence growing

- Major arms deal concluded
- Sov. advisors doubled in year (120-220)
- YAR mil. personnel to USSR for training

(VG 28: Map-Pak.)

b. Pakistan

(1) Feels isolated & threatened

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(a) Primary threat: Sov. move into Afghan

(b) Compounded by Gandhi's victory in India

(c) Fear of Moscow-Delhi alliance vs. Pakistan

(2) What will Pakistan do?

(a) Favoring closer relations w/US

-Leaders anti-Sov.

-See US as only possible counterweight

-Need mil. equipment

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(YG 29: Map-
Highlight
PRC, Koreas,
Japan, ASEAN)

C. Asia

-Rivalry & antagonism of PRC/USSR dominates

-Chinese determination to remain independent in foreign policy was reflected in her teaching Vietnam a "lesson" by mil. actions in Feb-Mar, despite contrary US advice
-But this was not a Chinese-VN affair as much as part of the struggle between PRC & Moscow over predominant influence in SEA
-Other concerns:

-Kampuchea

-Prospect of continued warfare, while pop. decimated by famine, disease

-5 major areas of anti-VN resistance as shown on map

-PP/Khieu Samphan can hold out

-But face 150,000-200,000 troops next graphic shows

(VG 30: Map-
Anti-VN Resistance)

(VG 31: Chart-
Kamp. Mil. Fcs.)

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-Could spill over into Thailand

-If VN hostilities intensify against Thai sanctuaries, Thai's continued support to PP could lead to clash
 -Would pose serious problem for new gov't

-In the north of Asia, Kim Il-song appears to be concentrating on quality improvements after a decade of mil. buildup

-Has not taken mil. advantage of the pol. uncertainty in South Korea following the assassination of President Pak
 -Will he continue to be restrained in '80; is he fomenting pol. cleavages in South in the quest for an opening?
 -Will he be able to achieve them?

D. Caribbean & Central America

(VG 32: Map-
 Cen. Amer./
 Carib.)

1. Deep-seated econ. & social problem in Carib. & Cen. Amer. continue to undermine traditional pol. institutions in region
 - Serious crisis likely in El Sal. during next few months
 - + Havana gains in Nic., Jamaica, Grenada, St. Lucia, Suriname
2. Cuba will continue to expand its influence & ties w/revol. groups
 - Increasingly center-left leaders, particularly in Carib., will view Cuba's involvement as legitimate role
 - Although popular domestic frustration building for several years
 - Not serious threat to Castro
 - Recent gov't changes largely cosmetic
 - But inc security measures not solve cause of unrest - which are primarily economic
3. Sovs.

Although view region as US sphere of influence; recent Sandinista victory, coup in Grenada & growth in left in El Sal. probably heightened interest

 - May spur Moscow to greater activity
 - But probably still prefers for Cuba to take lead
 - And recent moves into Afghan will make many Carib. & Cen. Amer. states cautious

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(VG 33: Map-
Africa)

E. Africa

1. We are in the midst of Great Britain's so far successful effort in Rhodesia

-The ceasefire agreed to at the Lancaster House Conference held despite widespread violence & intimidation

-The black majority election went off smoothly 27-29 Feb

-The election resulted in ...

-This means ...

-The next question will be the nature of the coalition/gov't, its success & future relationships w/its neighbors, esp. South Africa

-It will face difficult problems of how to deal w/the 3 competing armies, economic reconstruction, & reintegrating guerrilla fighters & displaced persons into national life

2. South Africa appears to be delaying a settlement in Namibia until it sees how things go in Rhodesia & until it is confident that SWAPO will lose a UN-sponsored election
3. We see little change in Angola, despite Neto's death; the regime's survival linked to Cuban presence
4. Elsewhere:

-In East Africa a big change is currently underway, involving perceptions of the region's importance to the US & Western Europe

-North Africa continues to be faced w/the Polisario question

-Central Africa was one area where the European ex-Colonial powers voluntarily returned to tidy up

-France & Belgium have helped to keep Mobutu's Shaba Province stable for over a year & a half

-But altogether, they've bought a breathing space, not a permanent solution